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" COMMODITY MARKETING AND STABILISATION". 
This is a subject which has been discussed fairly 
thoroughly by economists — especially during the post-war period. 
It is now, I venture to suggest, a subject of greater importance 
and urgency than ever. The reason for this is simple: most under-
developed countries are now engaged in economic planning and they 
are finding that one of the greatest constraints they have to deal 
with is shortage of foreign exchange with which to import capital 
goods. Developing countries today need to have stable and expand-
ing foreign exchange earnings. In Africa where most countries are 
at the earliest stages of economic development this requirement is 
reinforced by the fact that most of these countries have just 
obtained politica.1 independence while economically they are still 
(and they are very much aware of this) heavily dependent — de-
pendent in two senses: (a) they still depend on their former 
colonial masters for the sale of their exports e^ nd source of their 
imports; (b) they depend on one or two commodities for their foreign 
exchange earnings (and often these earnings are substantial propor-
tions of their GNP) e.g. in 1961 82% of total export earnings of 
Senegal came from groundnuts, groundnut oil and groundnut cakes. 
In the same year 60% of Sudan's total foreign exchange earnings cane 
from cotton; for Egypt this crop contributed 70% of total export 
earnings, (l) 
(l) The following table brings out the importance of certain 
export commodities in selected African Countries. 
Share of Principal Export Commodity 
in Total Esports - Average 1950-1958 
Country Gorxiodity % share-average 
1950-1958 
Mauritius Sugar 98.5 
Gambia Groundnuts 94.3 
Egypt Raw Cotton 79.3 
Liberia Rubber 73.2 
Ghana Cocoa 72.7 
Sudan Raw Cotton 62.9 
Rhodesia & Nyasaland Copper 58.0 
Ethiopia Coffee 58.7 
Book 
Number 
Source: Quoted, from the Yearbook of International Trade 
statistics, by the E.G. A. document E/CN.14/68 
NB: The importance of sisal, coffee, cotton, tea in East Africa 
does not need to be emphasised. 
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Another reason, which makes the problem of cor.xiod.ity marketing 
and stabilisation important and urgent today is this: that in most under-
developed countries population is increasing fast and therefore these 
countries have to rapidly increase their outputs and diversify them-
selves in-order-to feed the rapidly increasing population. In East 
Africa for instance where population increase is well over 2% per annum, 
we can expect population to double in 25 - 30 years. The important 
question to ask .is this, will the agricultural output also be doubled 
in this b'rief'period? (2) If it is not doubled then it means that 
the standards.of living m i l fall — and, therefore, in order to avoid 
this agricultural output must be increased by more than the rate of 
increase of population. This brings me to what I consider to be the 
ultimate solution of'this problem in underdeveloped countries: namely 
that there must be industrialisation and diversification of patterns 
of production in order to bring about some measure of balanced growth 
between the two main sectors (primary sector and secondary sector) 
at both the national and international levels. This, I would like to 
emphasise, is the ultimate solution. All the other measures we can 
think of are no more than palliatives — although this is not to sug-
gest that these palliatives are not important. But this is to antici-
pate our conclusions. 
In order to understand the problem of commodity marketing 
and stabilisation there are a number of things which sould be kept in 
mind: (a) that the so-called industrial countries themselves produce 
the bulk of the world supply of food and raw materials e.g. it is ^  
estimated that North America, Western Europe and Japan produce 90<%> of 
the foodstuffs and 70% of the raw materials they consume. It is also 
worth mentioning that some of the major wo.rld exports of primary pro-
ducts e.g. wheat, come from the developed countries. (b) That 
there is very little trade between the underdeveloped countries them-
selves (usually only 10% of their total volume of trade), e.g. in-
1961 Africa: exported abroad $ 6,550 million but intra-African exports 
were worth only $ 520 million. For most countries, however', the pro-
prcportion of their trade with other African countries isas much 
smaller than ?/hat can be inferred from the above figures — for the 
bulk of intra-African trade is trade between South Africa and Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland (actually 50% of recorded intra-African trade is trade 
between these two countries). (3) There is also a bit of trade 
between French-speaking North African countries and the French-speaking 
West African countries, (o) that most underdeveloped countries, as 
already mentioned, depend on. -one or two commodities for their foreign 
exchange earnings, (d) that' virtually in all cases no underdeveloped 
country is capable of tackling the problem of price stabilisation on 
its own and, therefore, concerted or international effort is required. 
These -joints are s.upposed to be introductory. For the 
purposes of our discussion I suggest that we try to answer the following 
questions: (a) Ti/hat is the nature of the problem, in commodity market-
ing and stabilisation, facing the underdeveloped countries? (b) What 
national measures can a country employ to mitigate the effects of ex-
port price instability? "What international measures can be taken to 
solve the problem — if a solution is possible? (d) What role can the 
consuming counries play in solving this problem? 
• • I will not atter.pt to answer the above questions in detail but 
I will mention one or two things which I consider to be important and 
on which we can base our discussion. 
(2) This ob viously, is simplifying a difficult problem and 
one should not just think of agricultural output- it is total output 
of all goods and services which is important. The rate of increase 
in population is not uniformly high but it Las been estimated that even 
if Africa doubled her agricultural out-put she cannot hope to raise the 
national income per head by snore than 0.5%. 
(5) There are a. few countries in Africa, however, which depend 
very much on other African countries for the sale of their exports. For 
instance in 1961 81% of upper Volta's exports went to Ghana. These ex-
ports were almost wholly live animals. The corresponding figures for 
Niger and Mauritania, a~ain in the same year, were 55% and 75% respectively. 
Footnote 3 continued - 3 -
Again the bulk of these exports were live animals 
exported to Ghana and Nigeria. On the import 
side, however, the picture was vastly dif-
ferent. The proportion of imports coming.from 
the rest of Africa for'Upper Volta, Niger and 
Mauritania, in 1961, were 22%, 19% and 1% 
respectively,, 
II 
The problem as I see it is made up of two factors: 
(i) Instability of prices of most primary products on which under-
developed countries, depend for their foreign exchange. 
(ii) The apparent downward secular trend in the prices of most 
of these products. 
The actual instability is due to a whole lot of factors 
— and, iti fact, we can think of natural instability and what-one 
could perhaps call 'economic' instability. Natural instability is 
caused by such things as weather, plant-diseases, pests, etc., 
This kind of instability works through the volume of output e.g. 
a drought or pest invasion could reduce a country's total output 
and therefore bring down the level of exports and foreign exchange 
earnings — the latter consequence depending' on whether these 
calamities fell upon only a few producers and were not widespread 
enough to seriously reduce the world supply and thus lead to higher 
prices. Yiftiat I have called 'economic' instability is primarily 
caused by the inelasticity of output and the instability of effec-
tive demand in the consuming countries. This is not the place to 
go into detail about either the inelasticity of output which I have 
mentioned (and it would be worth keening in mind that there is a 
difference between inelasticity of output and inelasticity of ex-
port supply) or the process of recession - transmission, except to 
mention that these are important forces, and that they contribute 
generously to both seasonal fluctuations and also the year-to-year 
fluctuations. 
The second part of the problem is that of downward secular 
direction of the prices of most primary products i.e. there is a 
persistent deterioration in the terms of trade facing the primary 
producers. Now, as is well-known, an improvement in the terms of 
trade is not always a favourable-, thing — unless it has been brought 
about by an increase in demand. At tines also, there might be a 
fall in (commodity) terms of trade because the country has become 
very efficient and can now produce more goods and sell them at 
lower prices. In a case like this the producing country is never-
theless doing well for the fall in price is more than compensated 
for by the increase in the .''volumes of sales. However, the deteriora-
tion in the- terms of trade facing the primary producers is a serious 
affair and brings about hardship - fo:r the amount these countries can 
expect from their exports is fallinr steadily although the actual 
volume of exports has been increasing steadily. I would suggest that 
the-unfavourable terms of trade will crontinue in the same direction 
for a number'of reasons the most impor'ta^t of which is technology. 
Advance in technology has meant two thungs: (a)'that the industrial 
countries can economise on raw' materials~a.nd, indeed, produce equally 
good substitutes while (b) this same advance in technology leads, 
through better and more efficient methods of production, to greater 
supplies of primary products. Orie then wonders, as Hirschman has 
asked, whether technological advance shiould be policed? The under-
developed primary producers are thus finding that they are getting 
less and less for more andl more exporrt quantities while their im-
ports do not get cheaper equivalent^. The p r o b l e m is made worse 
by the fact that for most underdeveloped countries coffee or cotton 
etc. are the only ways, of earning cas'.h - and they will therefore be 
produced even at lowe? p r i c es than those prevailing today. This is 
the real possibility of the so-called theory of imiserizing growth. 
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Briefly, then, there is a chronic disequilibrium between supply 
and demand— and this disequilibrium has brought about huge, accumulations 
of stocks of many primary products. These stocks themselves present a 
problem of their own — a problem which we cannot go into here except 
to mention that there is very little likelihood of their being eliminated 
in the near future for demand is not keeping up with supply for most of 
these products. This is not to suggest that demand could not be stimu-
lated above existing levels but I doubt whether it could be stimulated 
well enough to solve this problem unless acconpanied by effective measures 
aimed at reducing supply. (4) 
The above are what I would consider to be the main features of 
the problem. It becomes a problem of even greater importance when it is 
recalled that besides bringing down the levels of domestic incomes, 
fluctuations in export earnings also bring about falls in government re-
venue — the degree of severity of this depending on the extent to which 
the country concerned depends on foreign trade for its main source of 
revenue. We need not go into great detail in this — except perhaps to 
mention that besides having other unfavourable consequences, export 
price instability can be very expensive e.g. a government can be forced 
to abandon fairly sound projects, started in time of good prices, because 
of lack of funds due to fall in the prices of its exports. As for the 
secular downward trend in these prices we can expect the primary producers 
(perhaps except the oil countries) to be in persistently precarious balance 
of payments positions most of the time. 
Ill 
What palliatives can an underdeveloped country undertake to 
mitigate the effects of export price instability? The solution is 
obviously to try to reduce the direct link between export prices on a few 
commodities with the level of domestic income and general activity. 
This is easily said' it is not easily put into effect. Historically 
several devices have been used — stabilisation funds, Marketing Boards, 
Buffer stocks, export monopolies, stockholding, multiple exchange rates, 
etc. We do not have the time to go into detail about each of these 
devices. But we should mention that it should always be kept in mind that 
in attempting to insulate the domestic price given to the producer from 
the fluctuations of the actual export price, the ultimate aim should be to 
stabilise the producer incomes. It is often forgotten that price sta-
bility need not bring stability to producers' incomes e.g. if export 
prices vary inversely with the volume, then stabilisation of price 
would tend to destabilise the producer incomes by preventing movements 
in export prices from compensating for changes in the volume of ex-
ports. This is especially true where a country is a substantial pro-
ducer of the commodity in question. 
Nor should it be forgotten that perfect price stability is best 
achieved at zero price to the producer! This is, of course, an extreme 
point but it helps to bring out the important point that the lower the 
price to the producer the longer can the prescribed price be maintained. 
This brings about great dangers — especially when stability becomes an end 
in itself. What in fact needs to be done is not to simply stabilise a 
given level of incomes but, rather, to atter.pt to stabilise an upward 
t rend of th es e i nc one s. 
(4) It is often said that the problem lies in the fact there 
is a limit to what the human stomach can take a.nd therefore there must 
be a limit to what people can be expeo.ed to consume .in the way of primary 
products. This is true: but it is equally true that most of these pro-
ducts, are today very heavily tax:ed in the consuming countries and if 
prices were cheaper there is no doubt that there would be an expansion 
in the consuiption of these goodas. Also it should .not be forgotten that 
besides the human capacity to eat; the amount of ones income one consumes 
on food also depends on the corpcDsition of his diet. 
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It is perhaps worth pointing out that historically 
national measures of stabilisation have depended on a wide 
range of factors e.g. the attitude of the government to 
state intervention in the economy; the political power 
enjoyed by the farmers in the country; the budgetary 
position of the government;. the importance of the country's 
output in total world supply; the nature of the commodity; 
etc. In a number of countries stabilisation devices have 
become very strong sources of government revenue. This is 
often criticised; but the verdict on export taxes, say, 
cannot be easily delivered - for the sources of revenue in 
these countries are few and in a number of cases, . sudden 
increases in export prices are really windfall gains. 
A number of economists are of the opinion that historic-
ally the national stabilisation measures have been ineffective -
if not actually harmful. True, there are dangers in stabilisa-
tion policies but it is equally true that in Africa at any 
.rate most of the producers are small and simple peasants with 
little knowledge 'of the world market forces and who, therefore, 
need some measure of insulation. In the former British 
colonies and dependencies the attempt to insulate the producer 
has ¥een through the marketing board - a statutory body which 
participates in the actual trading (and often has a monopoly 
of export.) and operates a price assistance fund. In the 
former' French colonies the attempt to protect the producer 
is being tried through a somewhat different but broadly 
similar device - 'Caisse de Stabilisation der Prix' or Price 
Stabilisation Fund. These Stabilisation Funds (in former 
French colonies) are successors to the old 'Support Funds' 
which were operated in these countries during the second 
World War. The French-type Stabilisation Funds do not 
take part in the actual buying and selling of the commodities. 
They operate by controlling the private traders dealing in 
the commodity. They fix a minimum producers' price - the 
price actually being fixed by the Local Quotation Committees. 
This 'reference' price is fixed before the season - after 
looking at the spot and forward world prices as well as the 
price prevailing in France. (France buys most of these exports. 
She also largely fixes the price of groundnuts and controls 
that of cotton). How, if the exporter gets less than the 
reference price the Fund is"obliged to compensate him for 
the whole or part of the difference. And vice versa. In 
this way the Government has a lot of say in the trading-
margin. These Stabilisation Funds can draw extra funds from 
the French National Fund (The National Fund for the Stabilisa-
tion of Prices of Overseas Territories). This has been 
immensely helpful - for these Stabilisation Funds were 
started in time of low prices and the availability of funds 
from France means that the Funds can take a fairly long-term 
view. Anyway, it would be correct to say that the problems 
facing the former French colonies are somewhat less acute 
than those facing the formers British possessions. This is 
for a number of reasons - e.g. the integration of the old 
French colonies' exports with the commercial policy of ^rance 
plus the very generous preference granted to these ex-colonias' 
exports somewhat reduces the instability of export earnings 
of these ex-colonies. Moreover, the fact that the Stabilisa-
tion Funds can draw extra funds from France as they need them 
means that they have sufficient confidence in going about 
the ir activities. One very outstanding difference between 
•these Funds and the British-type Marketing Board is that the 
Stabil sation Funds in French ex—colonies are less involved 
in the economies of the countries in which they are than the 
Marketing boards in the former British colonies. 
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I think it would be wrong to say that these efforts have 
not achieved anything. I am, for one, convinced that they have 
played a useful part - in providing technical knowledge; in 
stabilising prices and at times incomes; in providing revenue 
for the government when alternative sourccs would not have 
yielded as much; in conjunction with the export taxes in 
preventing inflation; etc. But saying that stabilisation 
Funds and Marketing Boards have done all this is not to say 
that they have been uniformly effective and helpful. The 
only general advantage which can be claimed for them is that 
they have provided a way in which the government could tap 
the agricultural sector for the purposes of building the 
infra-structure and thus facilita-fo the emergence of other 
activities in the economy. 
National measures, however, cannot solve, "by themselves, 
the problem. For instance one country, even if it is the most 
important producer, cannot try to stabilise the price unilaterally -
without jeopardising its own position e.g. when Brazil,- in 
1930s, tried to hold up the price of coffee by holding back 
supplies, she was reduced from being a 60% world producer to 
the 45% world producer she has been in recent years. This 
happaned because other countries in Latin America and.Africa 
increased their supplies. Th u s it is easily seen that if for 
no other reason an international action is required- and today 
this takes the form of International Commodity Agreements. 
There are several difficuties in concluding inter-national 
commodity agreements. The first difficulty is also their 
greatest attraction and advantage - namely that they try to 
take into account all the interests of the exporting and 
i m p o r t i n g countries. It would be idle to expect these interests 
to be the same - and, in fact, there might be a conflict in the 
interests of, different producer-groups. But if we j.ust think 
of the producers and the consumers-; should the importing 
country be included in these agreements? : It is now generally 
agreed that they should be - and for the following reasons: 
(a) they, (the importers) will be convinced that the producers 
are not forming a suppliers' monopoly; (b) they can also help 
to bring all the producers into the agreement by threatening 
not to buy from non-members e.g. the present International 
Coffee Agreement is not really to the interest of the small 
producers like Uganda'but they have to join because U.S.A. 
will discriminate against non-members. (c) they can help by 
controlling recessions in their own countries. (We shall 
have occasion to return to this point). 
Another difficulty in concluding International Commodity 
Agreements is that these agreements usually deal with only 
one commodity - the export or the import. One would perhaps 
expect that if the agreement covered, say, the main export 
and the main import, they would be easier to conclude and 
maintain for sometime - for the exporter might be prepared 
to see the price of its commodity held down as long as the 
same thing wes done to its main import. But whereas this 
might be so for two commodities, an agreement covering a whole 
range of imports and exports would be ect •emely difficult to 
negotiate and also perhaps unrealistic - if only because the 
actual structure of imports and exports is changing all the time, 
There are other difficulties which we should mention. 
Some international commodity agreements (e.g. the Tin Agreement) 
require stockholding in the form of buffer stocks. Who is 
going to pay this cost? The importing countries might be pre-
pared to prevent the price from falling below a certain 'floor' 
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as long as they are promised that the price will not be 
raised above a certain 'ceiling', but will they also be 
prepared to share the cost of holding stocks? If the consum-
ing countries will not pay for the cost of holding buffer 
stocks, how will this cost be distributed among the producers? 
These-are important questions and they apply to all export 
(quota) restrictions schemes. (We might notice, incidentally 
that the buffer stock principle will only work where stocks 
do not deteriorate very much in value. This rules out most 
of the food products)o Another formidable difficulty is 
this: that for most commodities there are several varieties 
in each commodity each of which has different price patterns. 
This means that the interests of the producers of different 
varieties might conflict: how do you then bring about 
compromise and international co-operation in this ? 
The list of these problems could be extended - but it 
is not necessary. I just wanted to point out that over and 
above administrative difficulties there are several more, 
and more formidable, problems and difficulties in concluding 
international commodity agreements. This, incidentally, 
explains why we have so few of these agreements. 
International Commodity' Agreements can take several 
forms: they can take' the form of multilateral"long-term 
Contracts (e.g. the International Wheat Agreement); they 
can operate through quota restrictions on exports (e.g. the 
International Sugar Agreement and the International Coffee 
Agreement); or they can try to stabilise the price of the 
commodity concerned through a scheme, of Buffer Stocks (e.g. 
the International Tin Agreement). These types have their 
own difficulties and merits (see Appendix) but it should be 
mentioned that today there is the creat danger that some of 
these agreements could lower the total welfare of all the 
countries they are supposed to aid by giving protection to 
the high-cost producer and thus restricting output of the 
low-cost producers. This is certainly what is happening 
with the present International Coffee Agreement. In a number 
of African countries output could be substantially increased 
at small cost. It is also said that in Colombia improved 
methods of production could be introduced with greatly 
favourable effects on output but that this cannot be done 
because the export quotas are too small, 
In concluding this section on International Commodity 
agreements it .is important to say, again, that even these 
are palliatives not the ultimate solution. But these 
agreements, together with the national efforts,- -can be very 
useful in reducing short-run fluctuations and instability 
in export prices. But they should"not be looked at as per-
manent measures - if only beceuse they do not (and are not 
likely to) measure up to the problem at hand. 
In this problem of stabilisation of primary products 
export prices, the developed countries have an exceedingly 
important role to play. Briefly, they can do two major things 
(i) they can try and ensure that recessions in their 
own countries are minimised in order to keep up 
their levels of imports. They can go further -
they could remove the high taxes they levy on 
exports from underdeveloped countries - espeo ally 
taxes on tropical exotic products,, 
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(ii) they can give aid to underdeveloped countries for the 
purposes of capital formation in order to hasten 
industrialisation and diversification of these 
countries.5 This process will initially take the 
form of import-substitution, and it will require 
the good will of developed countries to allow tropical 
products to enter their ports free when the underdevelop-
ed countries themselves are charging protective taxes 
against the developed countries'-exports. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
The ultimate solution to the problem of export price 
instability is industrialisation and diversification - and 
nothing less. For this reason the palliatives which have to 
be used in the interim period should be designed under the total 
strategy for economic development - and they should help towards 
that goal. it is for this reason that ad hoc measures in this 
field are to be deplored and avoided. Also in the interim 
period the underdeveloped primary producing countries have to 
make a special attempt to export more and more of semi-finished 
goods and manufactured goods. If we take Africa for instance, 
five-sixths of its exports are food, beverages and raw materials. 
Actually this figure would be much higher "but for the fact that 
under the Standard International Trade Classification base 
metals come in the manufacturing section. 
The underdeveloped countries have also to try to trade more and 
more with each other. There is very little trade between under-
developed countries - and most of these countries are competitive 
instead of being, at any to some extent, complementary. In 
trying to increase trade among themselves they will need to come 
to some agreements about economic co-operation. Given this 
they could supply each other with most of their food requirements 
and also an increasing share of their needs for manufactured 
goods. 
One could also, in crude terms, say that underdeveloped 
countries have to think of making their economies depend on 
something produced and mainly consumed internally. The developed 
countries can have their economies more stable because they are 
the best consumers of the manufactured goods which they produce. 
In underdeveloped primary producing countries there is a great 
dependence on foreign trade and most underdeveloped countries 
hardly consume the goods they try to sell e.g. in East Africa 
we consume very little of the coffee, sisal, tea and cotton 
on which our economies so heavily depend. 
5. It might be worth mentioning that straight aid is •• 
better than transfer of inoome through artificially 
high prices (.e.g. if a group of producers and consumers get 
together and shift the terms of trade against the consumers 
this is, in effect, transfer of income from the consumers 
to the producers) - if only because high prices will tend to 
make the primary producers concentrate on producing more raw 




A full account of the merits and disadvantages of the 
various stabilisation principles there are would "be long and 
too involved for the purpose of this paper,, However, this 
is not something we can simply ignore in a paper of this 
sort and we shall therefore, very briefly, say ccnothing about it, 
A. THE EXPORT QUOTA (RESTRICTIONS) SYSTEM. 
This system of stabilisation has the following dis-
advantages : 
a. it implies misallocation of resources by 
b. protecting the inefficient (high-cost) producer 
and mhking it impossible for the efficient 
(low-cost) producer to increase his output. 
This system may also inhibit the introduction 
of new methods of production and improvement 
in the already existing methods. By doing this 
the system can easily keep supply below the 
optimum. 
c. Which base year shall be used to work out the 
quotas of various producers? 
d. How do you introduce flexibility in such a rigid 
system ? In particular, how do you take account, 
in the quota share-out, of future new and expand-
ing markets? 
The export quota system has, however, a number of 
advant age s : 
a. it is precise and manageable, 
b. it avoids stock accumulation, 
c. it requires little or 110 financing, 
d. it requires no continuous operating decisions -
as in Buffer Stocks system. 
B. THE SYSTEM OP PURCHASE CONTRACTS (MULTI-LATERAL CONTRACTS) 
This is the principle or system used for the International 
Wheat Agreement. The greatest advantage or merit of this 
system is that, provided that not all supplies are 
covered by it, it preserves the free market for the 
purpose of indicating the trend and also in•allocating 
the resources. This is no mean advantage - for in 
the absence of thorough-going central planning prices 
are valuable indicators and allocators of resources, 
(in the case of the International Wheat Agreement, 
however, the U.S.A. and Canada are such important pro-
ducers that their policies keep the free market price 
within the agreed floor and ceiling'prices). -
However, there are several requirements for this 
system to work - and the two most important are:-
a. the system requires that the governments of 
the participating countries be able to control 
trade in the commodity in question; 
b. it requires that the market be highly organised 
and that there be thorough standardisation 
of commodities by grades. 
It is well worth noticing that in this system politics 
become very obvious and can assume great importance. 
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C. THE BUFFER STOCK PRINCIPLE. 
This, in theory, is the ideal system. As it has often 
"been pointed .out this system strongly resembles the open 
market operations of a Central Bank - in that the system 
does not interfere with the working of the market but, 
rather, tries to change the balance between supply and 
demand. It is also claimed that in this system there is 
little government control in output and trade. It is 
alsso worth mentioning that this system allows competition 
between the high-cost and low-cost producers. But even 
here there are problems: 
a. Only some commodities can be held in stocks 
without deteriorating in value; 
b. where is the money to come from for buying and 
the maintenance of stocks? 
c. how do you prevent some suppliers from trying to 
increase their exports through subsidies? i.e. 
this system, in order to work well, requires a 
relatively more free market in which to operate. 
In fact it seems as if it is necessary to have a 
clause about export quotas, when needed, for this 
system to work out efficiently. 
d. timing is absolutely essential in a system like 
this - in oj-der not to accumulate stocks which 
would after a time be impossible to dispose of. 
This, incidentally, points out the danger, inherent 
in schemes of this sort, of speculation. The 
manager of the Buffer Stock should therefore have 
wide discretionary powers and the ability to act 
effect ively and swiftly if conditions suddenly change. 
e. this system requires continuous d e c i s i o n-making 
i.e. operating decisions e.g. whether to buy or to 
sell or to wait for a while, etc. 
Some of these problems in this system are made 
more formidable by the fact that there is, in any 
case, difficulties in reaching agreement about price 
ranges, volumes of operation, etc. Above all, a 
conflict of interests of producers and consumers 
(and between groups of producers most of the timei) 
seems inevitable. This, however, is not confined 
to this system. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion we can say, again, that international agreements, 
even when added to the national efforts, do not measure up to the 
problem at hand. But they can be quite helpful before the final 
solution (economic development .and industrialisation and diversifica-
tion) comes about. We do not need to remind ourselves, however, 
that it might be impossible to achieve 100% stability - and nor 
would 'it be really desirable. But we can be certain, however, 
that economic development and industrialisaation will reduce 
the importance of this problem. 
